Emotions are supposed to fit the circumstances. At a funeral, for example, grief and sorrow are warranted, and a norm of joylessness applies. Happiness is inappropriate; people regulate themselves so as to feel sorrow, and they censure displays of happiness by others.
The recognition that there are social norms for emotions departs from the early scientific framing of affective displays as biological phenomena (e.g., Darwin [1872] 1965). People do not emote simply because the animal within responds instinctively to certain predicaments. Rather, they intelligently guide their feelings and their displays of emotions to fit what is expected. At a funeral, sorrow for human loss is invoked at graveside; yet joy at renewing relationships with the living may be released at the wake. Even deviance from emotion norms can serve as intelligent rhetoric-for example, a person's irritability at a funeral may be a sign of ineffable resentment toward the deceased.
Emotion norms, their cultural reproduction, and their adaptation as means to ends are primary concerns of the sociology of emotions that has emerged during the last two decades (for summaries, see Heise and * We are grateful to participants in the social psychology training seminar, Department of Sociology, Indiana University, for their helpful criticism and suggestions. This work was initiated while the first author was the director and the second author a trainee in the Affect and Affect Measurement Training Program, PHS T32 MH15789. O'Brien 1993; Kemper 1993; Smith-Lovin 1994; Thoits 1989) . "The most studied topic in the sociology of emotions is probably the effect of emotion norms upon experience and expression" (Gordon 1990:163) . Almost every line of inquiry focuses on emotion norms.
One issue in the sociology of emotions is how emotions, with their obvious physiological concomitants, can be so normative. Kemper (1978) proposed that emotions are not simply socially controlled but also socially engendered, and that emotions fit social circumstances so often because particular social circumstances automatically produce specific emotions. In that sense, emotions are social automatisms. Affect-control theory (Heise 1979; MacKinnon 1994; SmithLovin 1990 ) offers a similar argument: emotions emerge automatically from the behavioral confirmation and disconfirmation of socially defined situations.
Interactionists focus on the paradox that emotions are social automatisms emerging from particular circumstances and yet sometimes can be deviant. A key to understanding this seeming contradiction is that influential people can shape emotion norms to reflect their ideology and to create resources for personal gain. Then others with alternative social understandings may emote differently than norms require. Hochschild (1983) analyzed such a pattern in the airline industry and introduced the concept of emotional labor to describe how flight attendants resolve dis-223 crepancies between their own emotional reactions and the prescriptions set by employers. Emotion work-generating prescribed emotions that override automatic reactionshas become a key concept for understanding how people respond in social arrangements where prescribed emotion norms conflict with emotional reactions (Thoits 1990) . Thoits (1985) considered the psychological burdens of emotion reactions that violate prescriptive norms. Recurrent deviant feelings require explanation, and individuals resourcefully concoct unauthentic emotion displays as interaction stratagems. Emotion norms provide one basis for doing this, as when someone displays prescribed guilt for behavioral deviance to forestall labeling or punishment (Heise 1989; Robinson, SmithLovin, and Tsoudis 1994; Smith-Lovin and Tsoudis 1993) .
Emotion norms concentrate certain feelings in particular situations; consequently social happenings take on characteristic ambiences. Collins (1991) linked this aspect of emotion norms to the garnering and distribution of social energies. Solidarity rituals produce moods that people carry away with them, mobilizing other social enterprises by the diffusion of activated states. By this principle, the normative emotions at religious rituals can diffuse goodwill to promote cooperative efforts.
Virtually every essay on the sociology of emotions presupposes that there are standard ways of emoting in particular circumstances -that norms exist to "specify the type of emotion, the extent of emotion, and the duration of feeling that are appropriate in a situation" (Smith-Lovin 1994:118) . Yet very little is known about the normative aspects of emotions. Instead, empirical work in the sociology of emotions has focused largely on how a range of emotional experience is shaped by social institutions or on the variety of social conditions that engender a specific emotion (e.g., Cancian and Gordon 1988; Goffman 1956; Hochschild 1983; Scheff and Retzinger 1992; Scherer, Wallbott, and Summerfield 1986; Simon, Eder, and Evans 1992; Steams and Stearns 1986) .
This study focuses specifically on emotion norms. In hopes of clarifying several issues in the sociology of emotions, we address a number of questions about how emotional states are linked with social happenings.
First, do prescriptive emotion norms define how an individual should feel in only relatively few consequential happenings, or are people's feelings socially controlled most of the time? Clear emotion norms might regulate feeling only in rites of passage and other situations noted for their emotional tone, leaving a vast arena for untrammeled personal feeling. On the other hand, prescribed emotion norms might accompany nearly every social transaction as a primary means for the social control of minds. Second, are there reactive norms of emotion as well as prescriptive norms? Conceivably, emotional responses to social situations might depend so strongly on idiosyncratic self processes (Denzin 1984) Third, what is the relation between prescriptive emotion norms and emotional reactions? People sometimes are disposed to emote differently than norms require; therefore they must work to bring their feelings into line with expectations. This could be the case if no reactive norms exist, so that very few people happen to emote as they "should." Or it could be the case because reactive norms exist but often are different from the prescriptive norms. On the other hand, it may be that prescriptive emotion norms generally are accompanied by matching reactive norms, which make emotion work unnecessary except in special circumstances.
Fourth, are emotional temperaments and styles regulated by the norms of emotion cultures? We approach this issue, raised by Gordon (1990) , in terms of gender comparisons. Brody and Hall reviewed the literature on gender differences in emotionality and found that in this culture, females are both stereotyped to be and in fact are more intensely expressive of both positive and some negative emotions.
... In some contexts, females have been found to be relatively weaker than are males in both expressing and recognizing anger and other outer-directed emotions (e.g., contempt). Males have also been found to report more pride in the self than do women, and fewer of the intropunitive affects (e.g., shame, embarrassment, guilt, and anxiety) (1993:452) . Thus the research suggests that the sexes have different emotion cultures and different emotional temperaments. We will investigate whether prescriptive norms diverge for males and for females; if they do so, and if females' and males' emotional reactions align with prescriptions, then cultural norms could be regulating differentiation in female and male emotionality. On the other hand, finding that sex differences in emotional reactions have little relation to prescriptions would imply that differing temperaments arise from gender differentiation itself rather than from normative shaping.
Fifth, what kinds of relationships require that people should display no emotion at all? This question arises from the prominence of "affective neutrality" as a pattern variable distinguishing primary from secondary relationships in Parsonian sociology (Parsons 1951) . Theoretically, people might be obligated to suppress emotions in work and professional encounters, presenting a neutral demeanor and maintaining conditions for enhanced rationality. On the other hand, Hochschild's (1983) research indicates that workers can be required to emote as part of their jobs. Additionally, affect-control theory proposes that information about institutional roles is borne in affect and that much institutional activity is generated via affective processes (Heise 1979) . This point implies that diverse emotions will arise in both primary and secondary relationships.
Scope of the Study
We investigated prescriptive emotion norms by asking college students how a participant should feel in a particular event. For example, one item in the questionnaires was "A funeral director shushes a woman. The woman should feel. . . ." We investigated reactive norms by rephrasing the same items in more personal, more immediate terms-for example, "Imagine a funeral director is shushing you. How do you feel at that moment?" Our instrument for recording emotion allowed respondents to choose quickly from 25 different emotional states (24 emotions plus "no emotion"). These 25 options constitute about one-fourth of the English emotion lexicon and are representative of the rest.
A modal response to the "should feel" question defines a prescriptive emotion norm in this study. The assumption is that plurality in specifying how a person should feel correlates with social awareness of that expectation and with individuals' tendencies to regulate themselves accordingly, and that plurality also correlates with the likelihood that contrary emotions will be socially censured. We treat the modal response to the "How do you feel?" question as a reactive norm, inasmuch as a reactive norm intrinsically is a statistical description of convergent responses. The assumption in this case is that emotions felt while imagining an event correlate with emotions that would be experienced in the lived event. ' The 128 happenings that we studied are stratified within different social institutions (e.g., law, medicine, religion). They involve a systematic range of interactants-from good, powerful, and active people such as physicians to bad, weak, and inactive people such as addicts. Behaviors, too, were selected systematically to represent supportive actions such as helping and congratulating, as well as detrimental actions such as seducing and insulting. We assured variability of interactants' identities and behaviors by consulting dictionaries with quantified measures of connotations that had been assembled originally for research in affect control theory (Heise 1979; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988) .
PROCEDURES

Instrumentation
We developed a recording instrument graphically configured as a spiral to let respondents select from 25 specific emotional states such as shame, anger, or depression while avoiding the tedium and frustrations of using classic mood-adjective check lists (Zuckerman and Lubin 1965) . The spiral configuration was derived from research on the structure of emotions; we forgo discussing the details here.
The instruction page from the study of emotional reactions is shown in Figure 1 . The 1 Our assessment of prescriptive norms employs the respondent as an observer of others, whereas our assessment of reactive norms elicits the respondent's personal reactions. This recentering of respondents' viewpoints in the two studies is appropriate to the distinction between prescriptive and reactive norms. Hedonistic factors, however, could be more prominent when respondents are asked to give their own reactions; such factors should be kept in mind in comparing prescriptive with reactive norms. Our questionnaires presented descriptions of social events and asked how one of the interactants in each situation should or does feel. An emotion spiral was included with each stimulus, and four stimulus-spiral combinations appeared on each page. On the average, respondents in our studies took about 20 seconds to read each one-line vignette, circle an appropriate emotional response, and check a level of emotion intensity.
INSTRUCTIONS
Stimuli
For the study of prescriptive norms, each event description presented Ego (named as "a man" or "a woman") and Alter (named by a social identity), with either Ego or Alter performing a social behavior on the other. The respondents were asked to specify the emotion that Ego should feel.
We generated stimulus events by systematically combining Evaluation-Potency-Activity (EPA) configurations for behavior and for Alter identity. (Evaluation, Potency, and Activity are universal dimensions of affective meaning; see Osgood, May, and Miron 1975) . Dichotomizing each EPA dimension as positive versus negative yields eight configurations (good-potent-active, goodpotent-inactive, etc.) of behavior or identity, and 64 behavior-identity combinations. EPA ratings of identities and behaviors were drawn from an available dictionary (Heise and Lewis 1988) .2 To increase the diversity of our 2 When only one or two behaviors fit the EPA profile for a category, we used behaviors that came close to fitting the profile. For example, "idolize" was the only word in the Heise and Lewis (1988) dictionary that fit the + -+ EPA profile (good, powerless, active) so we used "sweet talk" as a + -+ behavior although its EPA rating is .22, .13, .51 (or + + +). The demands of our stratified event sampling system also led us to use some events, we also systematically varied Alter's institutional affiliation by assigning an identity associated with academic, business, justice, medicine, religion, laity, family, or intimacy relations.
We used an 8 x 8 Graeco-Latin square to construct stimuli: patterns of behavior defined rows, patterns of alter identity defined columns, and institutions were the diagonal factor. The Graeco-Latin square generated 64 scenarios in which Ego was the object of Alter's action. To illustrate, we needed to create an event in a business setting with a good, potent, active (+ + +) actor (such as "flight attendant") engaging in a good, potent, active (+ + +) behavior (such as "assists") toward a man. Thus one of our scenarios is "A flight attendant assists a man. The man should feel...." We used the same design to generate another 64 scenarios in which Ego acted on Alter. For example, we required a lay relationship in which a woman engages in a good, powerful, active (+ + +) behavior (such as "rescuing") on a + + + object person (such as "hero"), so one of our stimuli is "A woman rescues a hero. The woman should feel...." The 64 stimuli with Ego as object plus the 64 stimuli with Ego as actor constitute the basic 128 events studied in this project.
To examine gender differences in prescriptive norms, we created additional sets of the same events with "man" and "woman" interchanged, for a grand total of 256 stimuli. These stimuli were distributed equally across four different forms, such that no identitybehavior combination appeared more than once in a form. Events in each form featured men and women equally, and object-egos and actor-egos equally.
The study of reactive norms used the same 128 events. In this case, however, the respondent became Ego in the stimulus. For example, the stimuli mentioned above were rephrased as "Imagine a flight attendant is assisting you. How do you feel at that moment?" and "Imagine you're rescuing a hero. How do you feel at that moment?" (We used a slightly different phrasing with nine instances of insinuated behaviors-for example, "You realize your landlord is evading you. How do you feel at that moment?") Gender comparison is based on the responidentities that turned out to be unfamiliar to some respondents (see Table 1 , note c).
dents' sex. The 128 stimuli were distributed into two questionnaires, following the same principles as in the prescriptive-norm study.
Respondents were encouraged to skip stimuli they did not understand. Events involving "grind," "teetotaler," " quack, "
"goody," "neurotic," and "killjoy" were skipped by unusual numbers of respondents (though more than 75 percent responded in every case). We included such offbeat characters in stimuli in order to present a range of characters in different social institutions and to sample diverse perspectives within American culture. Some rare but familiar events were included for the same reason. For example, "A maniac worships a woman/man" does not refer to an everyday occurrence, but such a phenomenon is a familiar part of American culture because of massive media coverage. For example, movie actress Jodie Foster was worshipped by John W. Hinckley Jr., who sought her attention via the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan in 1981.
Measurements of Respondents
The questionnaire elicited the respondent's sex, sexual orientation, age, race, citizenship, and parental income.3
The questionnaire included three items related to gender ideologies: "Women should take care of running their homes and leave running the country up to men" (agree, disagree, not sure); "Do you approve or disapprove of a married woman earning money in business or industry if she has a husband capable of supporting her?" (approve, disapprove, don't know); "Most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women" (agree, disagree, not sure). The questionnaire also collected information about the respondent's commitment to being "health conscious," "financially practical," "religious," "law-abiding," "familyminded," "educated," "normal," and "loving, caring." Questions on commitment used this frame: "How important to you is acting as a person? (I'm not concerned with this; I 3Our sample consisted mainly of white (81 percent) U.S. citizens (97 percent) of heterosexual orientation (99 percent). Parental income ranged from "less than $20,000" to "over $100,000," with 19 percent of the respondents reporting the median category of $61,000 to $80,000 and 23 percent in the modal category of $41,000 to $60,000. Age ranged from 18 to 45, with a median of 20. give this some effort; I give this a lot of effort.) "
The gender ideology responses were coded 1 for the first option (agree or approve), 2 for the third option, and 3 for the second option. A component analysis showed that responses to the gender ideology items were unifactorial; we also found that the responses correlated with religious commitment. We formed a single scale by doubling the range of the ideology items, then adding religious commitment and the "money" item, and subtracting the "homes" and the "politics" items. These scores, dichotomized at the median, identify respondents with traditional gender ideology. Forty percent of our "traditional" respondents accepted one or more statements of traditional gender ideology, and 30 percent more were unsure about one or more of the positions. Thirty percent were "traditional" simply by virtue of their religiosity.
Data Collection
The prescriptive-norm questionnaires were distributed in three sociology classes at a large midwestern university. One hundred and fifty-four persons were approached, and 152 volunteered to fill out a questionnaire; 149 provided data adequate for all phases of the study, yielding about 37 respondents for each of the four forms. The reactive-norm questionnaires were distributed in two other sociology classes, and 132 of the 133 students approached agreed to fill in the questionnaire; usable data for all analyses were provided by 125 respondents, or about 62 for each of the two forms. The questionnaire administrator interpreted the instruction sheet orally, and participants then spent about 25 minutes of class time completing the questionnaires.
RESULTS FOR PRESCRIPTIVE NORMS
In this section we report results for stimuli that presented an event involving a man or a woman and asked how the man or woman should feel.
Gender
We conducted a multivariate analysis of variance for frequency of use of all 24 emotion words, as a function of sex and of the questionnaire form that the respondent an-swered. Respondents' sex had no significant effect on how often they used different emotion words.
The events were presented twice-once with a female as the focal character, and once with a male-to male and female respondents. Consequently we can examine whether males and females prescribe different emotions for people in social situations and also whether emotion prescriptions depend on the focal character's sex.
For each event separately, we crosstabulated respondent's and focal character's sex with categories of emotional response. Tabulations using all 24 emotion options plus "no emotion" were beyond our resources because populating a 2 x 2 x 25 table would have required a respondent sample much larger than ours. Instead the tabulations employed the eight sectors on the emotion spiral plus "no emotion," for a 2 x 2 x 9 table that retains part of the qualitative richness of the data. Even the 2 x 2 x 9 tables were underpopulated, however, so we exercised the following cautions. We tallied statistical significance only when the probability associated with the likelihood-ratio chi-square and the probability associated with Pearson's chi-square were both less than .10 and when the probability associated with one statistic was less than .05. Instances were considered in detail only when both statistics were associated with probabilities less than . 04 .
Data for 10 events met the first criterion of significance; five met the second criterion. This outcome would be expected by chance if the data contained no significant interactions. That is, in 128 analyses we should expect to obtain five significant tables when using the .04 cutoff, and we should expect between six and 13 tables to be significant at a level between .05 and .10. Moreover, the median probability over all tables is .44 (based on Pearson's chi-square); this value is close to the .50 that would be expected if interactions were absent in the tables. These analyses indicate that emotion prescriptions are not conditioned by the gender of the observer or of the character observed.
Secularization and the feminist movement may have eliminated disparate emotion prescriptions for males and for females among many educated people. Gender effects might remain, however, among those who still maintain remnants of traditional gender ideology. Analyses restricted to the 73 "traditional" respondents halved our sample size. Thus we ignored respondent's sex and examined only whether more traditional respondents had distinctive emotion expectations for men as opposed to women, employing a 2 x 9 table for each event. We found 13 instances of gender-emotion interaction by our first criterion of significance; five events met our second criterion. Again, the numbers of significant results could be due to chance. In addition, the differences that arose hardly conformed to stereotypes specifying how traditional men and women should emote. For example, in "A vigilante sentences a man/ woman," a man's emotion was expected to be in the Embarrassed sector; a woman's, in the Furious sector. Thus our results indicate no significant relationship between emotion prescriptions and the emoting character's sex, even for respondents with more traditional gender ideology.
We also constructed quantitative measures of Pleasure, Dominance, and Arousal to analyze gender variations across events. The Pleasure variable was + 1 for any response in the Calm, Pleased, or Excited sectors, -1 for any response in the other sectors, and 0 for "no emotion" choices. The Dominance variable ranged from 1 for the Embarrassed sector through 8 for the Furious sector; "no emotion" was coded as 4.5. The Arousal variable was + 1 for responses in the Excited, Nervous, and Furious sectors, -1 for the Calm, and Unhappy sectors, and 0 for other sectors and for "no emotion." We computed analyses of variance for these three dependent variables, using the mean scores on 128 events as observations, in a factorial design that varied as to whether the subsample of respondents for computing means was male or female, whether the focal character in the event was male or female, and whether the character was the actor or the object of action. No sex factor was significant in a main effect or an interaction.
Finally, we coded each event according to whether or not respondents chose the extrapunitive emotions in the Annoyed and Furious sectors. Each event was coded four times: for female respondents assessing a woman's feelings, for females assessing a man's feelings, for male respondents assessing a woman's feelings, and for male respondents assessing a man's feelings. If more than 33 percent of the responses were in the Annoyed or Furious sectors, we coded the case as characterized by "male" emotions; otherwise the case was coded as characterized by "non-male" emotions. Chisquare for the cross-tabulation of respondent's sex by character's sex by male emotional response was not significant. Then we repeated the whole procedure, this time coding cases in terms of whether or not respondents selected "female" emotions mentioned explicitly by Brody and Hall (1993) : embarrassment, shame (ashamed), fear, nervousness, happiness, and sadness (unhappy). The chi-square for the crosstabulation of respondent's sex by character's sex by female emotional response was not significant. Thus "male" emotions were prescribed for a woman as often as for a man, and "female" emotions were prescribed for a man no less often than for a women.
We examined whether gender effects arose in the prescribed intensities of emotions rather than in the quality of the emotions (Brody and Hall 1993) . For each event, we crosstabulated respondent's sex and character's sex with four levels of intensity ("no emotion" being the lowest), ignoring quality of emotion for these analyses. Applying the same probability criteria as described above, we obtained the following results. Sixteen tables were significant by the first criterion. Data for eight events were significant by the second criterion. The number of significant results was beyond that expected by chance, by either criterion. This finding suggests that some gender differences exist in the prescribed intensities of emotions. On the other hand, such effects are far from omnipresent; gender effects in prescribed intensities of emotion did not arise for 87 percent of the events considered. Examination of the significant items in the intensity analysis suggested that encounters with disvalued others are supposed to be more emotional for women. We checked this possibility with a quantitative analysis and found that in fact both male and female respondents prescribed unusually high emotional intensity for females involved with disvalued others.
Prescriptive Emotion Norms
With evidence that gender is irrelevant to qualitative choices of emotions, we pooled data from male and female respondents and for male and female characters in order to tabulate the number of times each specific emotion was selected for each of the 128 events. Then we computed chi-squares to test whether the 24 emotion terms plus the "no emotion" category were equally likely to be chosen as the way a woman or a man should feel for each event. The null hypothesis, that each emotion word was chosen by about 1/25 of the respondents, is rejected at the p ' .04 level of significance for every one of the 128 events (the probabilities are less than .01 for all but two of the events). Thus pervasive prescriptive norms of emotion exist in the sense that people agree at above-chance levels about what emotions should be felt in response to any event.
Highlights of the data are summarized in Table 1 . The stimulus event is displayed in the left-hand column; an ellipsis indicates that the event appeared twice in our prescriptivenorm questionnaires, once with "woman" as the focal character, and once with "man" as the focal character.
The middle column of Table 1 shows the prescriptive emotion norm for each event.
The given emotion is the modal response or the response that is most central in a set of congruous choices, as defined below. The number in parentheses is the mean prescribed intensity for the emotion on an assumedinterval scale ranging from 1.0 for low intensity to 3.0 for extreme intensity.
Bold highlighting of the modal emotion means that a majority of respondents chose the modal category. These well-defined emotion norms for which more than 50 percent of respondents selected the same category appeared for 19 events, or 15 percent of all the events we presented to respondents. A focal character should feel ashamed in 10 of these events, and five should produce pride. The prominence of these two emotions supports Scheff's (1990) treatment of shame versus pride as a critical axis in affective response to social situations. Embarrassment, nervousness, annoyance, and happiness also were strongly modal for some events.
The modal frequency was more than twice the frequency of any other choice for an additional 30 events-the cases in which the emotion is displayed with single underlining. Shame, pride, and annoyance each occurred five times in this set; "no emotion" occurred six times. Adding these events to the previous 19, we find 49 events-38 percent of the total -involving a modal prescriptive norm of emotion.
Emotion choices were congruous for another 63 events (the cases in which the c Missing data for 15-23 percent of the subjects due to typographical errors on a prescription-norm form in the case of "sings to an infant" and "employer distrusts." The other items presumably were skipped because some subjects did not know the meanings of constituent words. emotion is listed with no underlining). In these cases, secondary modes-emotions that were chosen at least half as often as the modal choice-were in the same sector as the primary mode, or else all modes were in a set of sectors with one sector adjacent to the rest. (We treated "no emotion" as occupying the middle of the affective space and thereby adjacent to all sectors; the Embarrassed sector as vertically adjacent to the Unhappy, Annoyed, and Furious sectors; and the Nervous sector as vertically adjacent to the Annoyed and Furious sectors.) Adding the cases of congruous expectations to the modal cases, we find 112 events-88 percent of the total-in which an emotion norm prescribed at least a diffuse affective tone. None of the modal norms involved low arousal, but seven of the diffuse norms centered on emotions in the Calm or Unhappy sectors.
Competing and incompatible emotion norms arose in 16 events (12%). Some examples show that these involve major variations both in hedonic tone and in activation:
A person debating a subordinate should feel annoyed, calm, or excited; A person dressing an alcoholic should feel proud or ashamed; Someone observed by a physician should feel nervous or at ease. The prompt eliciting prescriptions was "The woman/man should feel . . .," and the word "should" contains some ambiguity. It was supposed to be read in the sense of "ought," but also could have been read as "would." Thus some of the incompatible norms may contrast what some respondents thought people ought to feel with what other respondents thought people probably do feel. This interpretation implies that one among a set of conflicting norms will correspond to a reactive norm. This is not always the case, however (as one can see in Table 1 by comparing the second column with the third; the third column shows reactive norms). Thus it is likely that some cases of incompatible norms identify real conflicts in prescriptions.
To summarize, we found a central tendency in emotion prescriptions for most of the events that we considered, but conflicting norms appeared with some events. Prescribed emotions in various circumstances included both pleasant and unpleasant emotions, states of arousal and of nonarousal, and emotions of vulnerability as well as emotions of dominance.
"No emotion" was the prescribed affective state in six cases, 5 percent of the total. Yet we absorbed "no emotion" as adjacent to other emotional states when defining diffuse norms, so the prevalence of "no emotion" choices is somewhat hidden in Table 1 . In fact, "no emotion" was the primary mode, or was chosen as least half as often as the primnary mode in 18 percent of the events. These "no-emotion events" are affectively neutral as compared with other events, in part because some respondents prescribed no emotion as the appropriate affective state and in part because the rest of the respondents tended to prescribe low emotional intensity. The number of "no-emotion" choices correlates with the average intensity for other choices, r= -.63.
RESULTS FOR REACTIVE NORMS
This section reports results for stimuli that hypothetically involved the respondent in an event and asked the respondent "How do you feel at that moment?" Gender A significant effect for sex was produced by a multivariate analysis of variance for frequency of use of the 24 emotion words, as a function of sex and of the questionnaire form that the respondent answered. Across the 64 events that each respondent considered, females more often said they would feel "embarrassed," "scared," or "ashamed," while males more often said they would feel "calm," "happy," or "joyless."
For each event, we cross-tabulated respondent's sex with the eight sectors on the emotion spiral plus "no emotion." A lenient criterion of statistical significance was fulfilled when the probability of the likelihoodratio chi-square and the probability of Pearson's chi-square were both less than .10, and when the probability associated with one statistic was less than .05. A more stringent criterion required both statistics to be associated with probabilities less than .04.
We found no significant difference for 81 percent of the events, but data for 24 events (19%) met the first criterion of significance, and data for 13 events (10%) met the second. The percentages are about double what might be expected by chance, an indication that emotional reactions differ by sex for some events. Table 2 shows events in which sex differences meet the stringent criterion of significance.
The first three events in Table 2 suggest that females more than males are disposed to rage when a significant or trusted other rejects them. The same pattern emerges in "parent denouncing," though the sex difference is not significant. Similarly, the majority of females responded in the Furious sector to a "housekeeper blackmailing," though in this case the majority of males did so as well.
The next five events in Table 2 can be viewed as implicating the respondent in social ruination of another or of self. In these cases, females are more likely than males to report emotions in the Embarrassed sector. A similar pattern for "humbling a warden" also is significant by our less stringent significance criterion.
The events in Table 2 involving "critic," "bellhop," and "bisexual male" suggest that males more than females may be disposed to Table 2 . Events with Significant Sex Differences in Emotional Reactions dominance emotions when threatened by a socially distant character. "Evangelist condemning" shows the pattern and is significant by our less stringent criterion. "Vigilante sentencing" also shows the pattern, though the sex difference is not significant. On the other hand, the sexes do not differ in dominance emotions for "bailsman exploiting," "bouncer evicting," and "disciplinarian doubting." Moreover, females show significantly more dominance emotions for "spinster laughing at," by our lesser criterion.
The items "spouse ogling" and "nuzzling a porno-star" suggest that males' and females' emotional reactions are differentiated in sexual events. Sexual matters, however, also are intimated in events involving "bigamist," "blind-date," "innocent," "lover," "prude, " "puritan," "virgin," and "chaperon," but only the last reveals gender differences that are significant by our less stringent criterion. Lacking a generalization, we simply note that many males were flabbergasted at the thought of being ogled (about one-third of the males skipped the item), and many females were disgusted by the thought of nuzzling a porno star.
We quantified Pleasure, Arousal, and Dominance as described in the section on prescriptive norms and conducted an analysis of variance of the mean scores for all 128 events, in a factorial design that varied whether the subsample of respondents for computing means was male or female, and whether the respondent was the actor or the object of the hypothetical action. No sex factor was significant in a main effect or an interaction. However, we also averaged respondents' Pleasure, Arousal, and Dominance over the 64 events to which they responded, and then conducted an analysis of variance of individuals with respondents' sex and questionnaire form as factors. In this case, respondent's sex significantly influenced Pleasure, Arousal, and Dominance. Overall, females emoted more negatively than males, with more arousal, and with more vulnerability. The difference between the results of these two analyses implies that differences in emotional response between the sexes are smaller than variations in emotion induced by different events, but that these differences between the sexes are an important component of individual differences in emotionality.
We found no evidence that males are more disposed to "outer-directed" emotions of anger and contempt. For males and females separately, we dichotomized events into those for which the modal response was in the Annoyed or Furious sector versus elsewhere, and then cross-tabulated this dichotomy with sex and with whether the respondent was actor or object in the hypothetical events. No significant interaction appeared in the table.
The intensity of emotional reactions did not differ by sex. For each event, we crosstabulated respondent's sex with our four levels of intensity, ignoring quality of emotion. A sex difference was significant in eight tables by our lenient criterion and in five tables by our stringent criterion. These numbers of significant results are no more than would be expected by chance. We also computed mean intensity over the 64 events presented to a respondent, and then conducted an analysis of variance of individuals, with respondent's sex and questionnaire form as factors. The respondent's sex was not related significantly to the average intensity of emotional responses.
Reactive Emotion Norms
Combining female with male respondents, we tabulated the number of times each specific emotion was selected for each of the 128 events and computed chi-squares to test whether the 24 emotion terms plus the "no emotion" category were equally likely to be chosen as a way of feeling in each event. The null hypothesis, that each emotion state was chosen by about 1/25 of the respondents, was rejected at the p ' .04 level of significance for every one of the 128 events (actually the probability is less than .01 for every event). Thus reactive norms of emotion do exist. Respondents' emotional reactions converged at above-chance levels, despite some significant female-male differences.
Highlights of the data on reactive norms are summarized in the right-hand column of Table 1 . Majority norms, modal norms, diffuse norms, and conflicting norms are defined in the same manner as prescriptive norms, and the use of underline, italics, and boldface are the same as defined previously. In addition, the norm for each sex is presented separately wherever females' and males' distributions differ significantly.
In 11 events, a majority of respondents converged on a single option. In another 29, the modal frequency was more than twice the frequency of any other choice. These unequivocal reactive norms occurred for 31 percent of all events. In another 56 events, modes and secondary modes were congruous in affective tone. Adding these to the modal norms, we find 75 percent of the events producing emotion reactions with at least a diffusely defined affective tone. Moreover, the norms for both sexes were identical in eight of the 24 events involving significant gender differences in distributions, so a shared reaction norm actually occurred for 81 percent of all events. Conflicting norms of emotional reaction occurred with 19 percent of the events. Sex differences were implicated in two-thirds of the conflicting norms; eight events (6%) involved differences in emotional reaction that were not associated with sex differences.
Respondents converged on a response of "no emotion" for 12 events, or 9 percent of the total.
DISCUSSION
Our student-based questionnaire study was an economical form of research suited to the exploratory nature of this work. Studies of diverse populations, however, based on both questionnaires and systematic observations will be needed to deepen the study of emotion norms. Some studies should explore the consequences of presenting events with known relevance to the respondent population, and of describing the events in greater detail than we did so as to narrow the interpretations. The invocation of prescriptions and emotional reactions should be examined with different wording of questionnaire prompts (e.g., using ought rather than should to evoke prescriptions). Other emotion-recording instruments also should be employed-such as the Affect Grid of Russell, Weiss, and Mendelsohn (1989) or, in observational studies, the Facial Action Coding system of Ekman and Friesen (1978) .
Respondents in both of our studies chose diverse emotions in response to many stimuli. We computed co-occurrence coefficients for the emotion choices across all stimuli, applied nonmetric multidimensional scaling, and essentially reproduced the emotion circumplex (Fisher et al. 1985; MacKinnon and Keating 1989; Morgan and Heise 1988; Russell 1980; 1983) in each study. This outcome might be expected because the circumplex was used to format our data collection instrument, but the analyses nonetheless demonstrated that alternative choices of emotion connote similar Pleasure and Activation, in our studies as in others (Russell 1989) . The variety of emotion specifications spreading from the modal category corroborated Gordon's (1990:164) observation: "Emotion norms prescribe a range of permissible feeling, not a precise point. "
The scaling analyses showed that the measuring instrument depicted in Figure 1 can be improved in future studies. The emotion "scared" actually belongs in the Nervous sector because "scared" is employed congruously with "nervous." ("Scared" could replace "impatient," which was used infrequently by respondents in the prescriptive norms study and which was used congruously with "annoyed" in the reactive norms study. "Crushed" would be an appropriate replacement for "scared" in the Embarrassed sector.) Granting that there is much to learn from subsequent studies, we now summarize information gained from this one.
The Existence of Emotion Norms
Prescriptive emotion norms exist for all of the social events we sampled. The norms focus formulaically on a specific emotion about one-third of the time and on diffuse affective states otherwise. Normative conflict rather than normlessness characterizes the relatively few events showing a lack of central tendency in emotion expectations. Because our sample of events systematically varied kinds of interactants, kinds of interpersonal behaviors, and institutional affiliations, we conclude that emotionality is normatively regulated in virtually all social encounters within American middle-class culture.
Reactive emotion norms also exist for all of the social events we sampled. That is, respondents' emotions converged on modal responses as the respondents imagined themselves in particular encounters. Even when the responses did not converge on a single emotional state, they concentrated on several different modes rather than being random. Consequently we conclude that particular social circumstances tend to produce specific emotions, as postulated by social automatism theories within the sociology of emotions.4
Prescriptive-Reactive Discrepancies Prescriptive emotion norms and reactive emotion norms are identical in 38 percent of the events in Table 1 . In another 5 percent of 4 A reviewer raised the possibility that norms might have emerged because respondents tried to be helpful. The clarity of the normative structures in both studies suggests that even if respondents were making an effort to give answers a sociologist would want, they must have been relying on normative information when they guessed the "right" answers. Thus the conclusion remains: ubiquitous emotion norms exist. the events the reactive norm is the same as one of the options in a prescriptive-norm conflict; thus people's reactions agree with what some people think is appropriate. In another 12 percent, one of several modal reactions agrees with a prescriptive norm. On the other hand, in 45 percent of the events we find a discrepancy between emotion prescriptions and emotional reactions.
These results can be viewed from two perspectives. First, people do not need to work to bring their emotions into line with expectations in every social situation; sometimes they are disposed to feel what they are supposed to feel. Thus the need for emotion work is bounded.
Second, people sometimes have emotional reactions that must be masked and overidden in deference to prescriptive emotion norms. Such predicaments arise in a variety of social situations, so demands for emotion work go far beyond the commercialized emotional labor that has been the focus of research literature.
Many of the discrepancies between prescriptions and reactions that appear in Table 1 are not large, an indication that emotion work often is not arduous. Consider a person assisted by a flight attendant. The reactive norm in this case is to feel contented, but the prescribed norm is to feel pleased. The passenger would like to sigh and settle back in her seat with a faint smile, but she feels obligated to face the attendant alertly with a broad smile or a grin and some sparkle in her eyes-a little extra activation until the attendant moves on.
Six events in our sample involve discrepancies that require wrenching from one pole of an emotional state to another. Four of these involve taking an attitude of dominance or submission when one feels the opposite ("dropout manipulates," "evangelist condemns," "vigilante sentences," and "bawling out a registered nurse"). "Consoling a beggar" in the presence of an observer requires forgoing empathic unhappiness in order to seem pleased with one's opportunity to be magnanimous. "Serving a houseguest" requires people who are disposed to nervousness in such a situation to suppress their feelings in order to give the impression of being at ease. The low proportion of situations requiring strenuous emotion work suggests that social definitions generally are organized so as to preclude such work. Demands for strenuous emotion work arise, however; they may arise more frequently than is suggested by our study, because we sampled events to represent a broad range of things that could occur rather than to reflect the frequencies of everyday happenings.
Gender Differences
Prescribed emotions were not a function of whether the focal character was a woman or a man, or whether respondents were male or female. Our respondents-both male and female-prescribed stereotypically "female" emotions for a man just as often as for a woman, and they prescribed stereotypically "male" emotions for a woman just as often as for a man. We obtained the same results when we selected the most traditional respondents and analyzed only their data. Because the respondents in this study, mostly age 20 or more, are representative of people who promulgate norms in our society, the results very likely describe the prescriptive norms of emotion that regulate the feelings of American middle-class young adults.
Thus we found no evidence that emotion cultures separate men's and women's qualitative feelings by prescribing different emotions for the sexes. In fact, prescriptive norms inhibit gender differences in emotions by calling for the same feelings from both sexes.
A different story about gender developed from the analyses of emotional reactions, where significant sex differences occurred for 19 percent of the events in our sample. Females more than males described their feelings in terms of the stereotypically female emotions, "embarrassed," "scared," or "ashamed," and females emoted overall with somewhat more displeasure, arousal, and vulnerability. This finding accords with Brody and Hall's (1993) generalization that females are more inclined toward intropunitive affects. Males more often said they would feel "calm," "happy," or "joyless." The relative positivity of the male preferences perhaps reflects the Brody and Hall generalization that males show more pride in the self. Contrary to Brody and Hall's report, however, males were not more disposed to stereotypically male "outer-directed" emotions of anger and contempt. Indeed, we found situations in which females experienced these dominance emotions more strongly than males.
The sex differences in emotional reactions could be due to female and male differences in emotionality, conceivably with a chromosomal basis. Yet if one assumes that emotional reactions emerge while one participates in social events, as proposed by social automatism theories of emotion (Kemper 1978; Smith-Lovin 1990) , then the differences in emotional reactions would originate in the differences between females' and males' social structural positions within events, or in differences in socialization backgrounds that lead to different interpretations of events. We offered several conjectures about the kinds of events that generate sex differences: 1) females more than males are disposed to rage when a significant or trusted other rejects them; 2) in ruination of self or of other, females more than males are prone to intropunitive emotions; 3) males more than females may be disposed to dominance emotions when threatened by a socially distant other.
Our respondents expected more intensity of emotion from females, especially in interaction with disvalued others, but that prescription did not correspond to reactions. On the average, females and males recording their own feelings did not differ in intensity. Brody and Hall (1993:449) reported that "the finding of generally greater affect intensity in females is well established," but our results suggest that future studies should distinguish carefully between expectations and actual experience.
Prescribed Emotional Neutrality
If secondary social relationships are more affectively neutral than primary relationships, then prescriptions to feel no emotion should be concentrated in academic, business, justice, and medical relationships, while occurring rarely in family or intimacy relationships. (Religious and laity relationships might be either primary or secondary, so we make no prediction in these cases.) We estimated a log-linear model for each type of relationship to see whether it involved an unusual number of events with no-emotion prescriptions.
The number of no-emotion norms was what might be expected for academic, business, family, intimacy, and laity events, in view of the number of events involving each such relationship and the total number of events with no-emotion norms. Unusually few no-emotion norms occurred for events in the justice system and in religion. An exceptionally large number occurred when the partners were medically defined: about one-quarter of all medicine-relevant events in our sample had no-emotion prescriptions.
These results suggest a trickle of noemotion prescriptions in diverse circumstances. Lack of emotionality is considered appropriate even in family and intimacy situations (though our two instances in this area involve marginal characters-stepfather and chaperon).
On the other hand, affective neutrality is far from a defining feature of secondary relationships. Emotional-neutrality prescriptions were concentrated in one arena of secondary relationships-medicine-but even there most of the sampled events were expected to be emotional. We found no notable concentration of no-emotion prescriptions in two other arenas of secondary relationships-business and academia. Events in the justice system were supposed to be less emotionally neutral than elsewhere.
These results suggest that emotionality is a ubiquitous concomitant of social interaction in both primary and secondary groups. In particular, many commercial and professional transactions are expected to be emotionally charged in orderly ways, just as Hochschild (1983) said. Rather than undermining rational objectivity in social institutions, affectivity must be nonharmful, or even productive. Affect control theory clarifies how affectivity could be productive in social institutions: "[T]he theory supposes that cultural sentiments can regenerate the standard events from which they have evolved, so that the affective system provides the means for storing a society's heritage of socially structured interaction" (MacKinnon 1994:180) . The affective meanings of identities and behaviors make essential the rationality of the past, and emotions arise in social institutions as that stored rationality is applied and tested in current affairs.
